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JAPANESE KNOTWEED AND ECONOMIC LOSS IN NUISANCE: 
FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL HARM IN TORT 
Dr Mark Wilde* 
Abstract 
In two recent cases, the courts have had to grapple with liability issues arising from the spread of 
Japanese Knotweed, a pernicious weed which is said to cause structural damage. One of those cases, 
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Williams, was heard by the UK Court of Appeal where the 
arguments focused on the applicability of the tort of nuisance. The claimants were principally 
concerned about the property blight caused by the spread of the weed from a railway embankment 
onto their land. The litigation raises some important doctrinal points on the recoverability of 
economic loss in private nuisance. On a wider level, it also sheds light on how environmental harms 
can be framed as private financial losses which engage remedies in tort.   
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1. Introduction 
The subject of ‘invasive species’ and liability for the spread of such natural phenomena has received 
scant attention in UK case law. However, the subject has recently come to the fore In Network Rail 
Infrastructure Ltd v Williams in the law of tort.1 The Court of Appeal, in an approved judgment 
delivered by Etherton MR, upheld a decision of the Cardiff County Court finding that Network Rail 
Infrastructure Ltd is liable in private nuisance for harm caused by the spread of Japanese Knotweed 
from its property; notwithstanding the fact that the harm fell short of actual structural damage to 
                                                          
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Reading, United Kingdom (m.l.wilde@reading.ac.uk). 
1 [2018] EWCA Civ 1514, [2018] 3 WLR 1105.  
2 
 
neighbouring property. Although, as will be seen, the Court of Appeal disagreed with much of the 
reasoning applied by the County Court.  
Aside from the liability implications for Network Rail, and other large landowners who may be in a 
similar position, the case raises a number of important doctrinal issues regarding the nature of harm 
in private nuisance and, in particular, how blight is conceptualized as actionable harm. Is it ‘pure 
economic loss’ and, if so, is this recoverable in private nuisance? In a specifically environmental 
context, these issues tie in with debates regarding how one frames certain environmental harms in a 
manner which engages liability in tort.  
2. Factual background to the case 
Japanese Knotweed (Fallopia Japonica) is a pernicious weed which was first introduced to the UK as 
an ornamental plant in the mid-nineteenth century.2 It is regarded as an invasive species, or ‘non-
native’ species to use the formal terminology, notwithstanding the length of time that it has been in 
the country.3  It spreads horizontally underground in an insidious manner and shoots up rhizomes 
which are capable of breaking through concrete and undermining foundations – although recent 
research suggests that the threat has been overstated.4 Railway embankments harbour all manner 
                                                          
2 JP Bailey and AP Conolly, ‘Prize-Winners to Pariahs - a History of Japanese Knotweed s.l. (Polygonaceae) in 
the British Isles’ (2000) 23 Watsonia 93.  
3 See Non-Native Species Secretariat (NNSS), ‘Japanese Knotweed and Development’ 
http://www.nonnativespecies.org/index.cfm?pageid=160  accessed 9 May 2019.  
4 See research undertaken by the University of Leeds and AECOM: Mark Fennell, Max Wade and Karen Bacon, 
‘Japanese Knotweed (Fallopia Japonica): an Analysis of Capacity to Cause Structural Damage (Compared to 
Other Plants) and Typical Rhizome Extension’ (2018) PeerJ 6:e5246 https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.5246  
accessed 9 May 2019.  
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of domestic and ornamental plants which have escaped the bounds of neighbouring gardens and 
this is how Japanese Knotweed entered the outside world.   
The claimants in this case owned neighbouring bungalows in close proximity to a railway 
embankment on the Bridgend to Maesteg line in South Wales. It was estimated that the plant first 
took hold on the railway embankment about 50 years ago, but had been contained until more recent 
times. The essence of the claim was that rhizomes had infiltrated the foundations of the claimants’ 
bungalows although they had yet to cause structural damage. Nevertheless, the properties were 
fatally blighted and had been rendered unsaleable with obvious financial implications. 
 
3. The County Court proceedings 
The Recorder, Judge Grubb, sitting in the Cardiff County Court, held in favour of the claimants on the 
grounds that, irrespective of any damage to the fabric of the property itself, the mere presence of an 
undesirable element in close proximity to the claimants’ property constituted actionable harm. 
Although Network Rail was not responsible for bringing the weed onto its land in the first place, it 
was well established that one can be liable for continuing a nuisance that one did not originally 
cause. This is provided that one has control over the nuisance and failed to take steps to abate it 
which introduces an element of fault into the equation.5 Network Rail was found to be at fault in 
that it had constructive knowledge of the problem, but failed to take adequate steps to abate it.6    
                                                          
5 See, for example, Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 and Leakey v National Trust for Places of 
Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485.  
6 The constructive knowledge arose from the fact that the problem was widely reported in literature and 
guidance readily available to all those with responsibility for managing large property portfolios. Particular 
emphasis was placed on joint guidance issues by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) and the 
Property Care Association: see RICS, Japanese Knotweed and Residential Property (IP 27/2012).  
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At this point it should be noted that, coincidently, in contemporaneous proceedings, the Truro 
County Court had reached a similar conclusion in another Japanese Knotweed case, Smith v Line.7 
This concerned an application for injunctive relief against the defendant in respect of the spread of 
the weed from her property onto the claimant’s land. In this case, the defendant had sold a parcel of 
land to the claimant but had retained an adjoining strip. The weed had been present on both parcels 
of land at the time of the sale, but the claimants had subsequently eradicated it. The defendant had 
failed to follow suit, and, in time, the weed spread back onto the claimant’s land from the adjoining 
strip maintained by the defendant, due to her failure to properly manage the problem. The case 
raised very similar issues to Williams, although it is likely that any appeal was held in abeyance 
pending the outcome of that case.  
4. The main issues on appeal 
4.1 The encroachment cases 
The main ground of appeal was framed in terms of whether pure economic loss is actionable in 
private nuisance. There were two main strands to the reasoning applied in the County Court 
judgment. Firstly, the Recorder rejected an argument that the case fell with the so-called 
‘encroachment cases’ concerning encroaching tree roots and the like. He referred to Delaware 
Mansions v Westminster City Council8 as authority for the proposition that, in this subset of private 
nuisance, physical damage is a prerequisite. His Honour Judge Carr, in the Truro County Court, 
reached a similar conclusion in Smith v Line. However, the Recorder in Williams delved deeper into 
the law and asserted that the claim ‘went against the grain of legal history’ in that such claims 
derived from a medieval form of action known as ‘action on the case’ (usually abbreviated to case) 
where physical damage was a necessary ingredient. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on 
the narrow ground that the historical analysis was inaccurate and there were several examples 
                                                          
7 [2017] 11 WLUK 106.  
8 [2001] UKHL 55, [2002] 1 AC 321 
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where case based nuisance actions had covered non-physical harm.  On a broader level, the Court 
cautioned against adopting an overly historical analysis on the grounds that:  
In recent times a number of decisions at the highest level have introduced greater 
coherence and consistency to the legal principles governing the cause of action for private 
nuisance. The consequence is that it is neither necessary nor profitable to focus on historic 
cases of nuisance and the early development of the cause of action.9  
This could lead to an overly rigid and formulaic approach which could fetter the ability of the tort to 
respond to changing social conditions: 
The difficulty with any rigid categorisation is that it may not easily accommodate possible 
examples of nuisance in new social conditions or may undermine a proper analysis of factual 
situations which have aspects of more than one category, having regard to existing case 
law.10 
Thus, it was necessary to recognise that ‘the concept of damage in this context is a highly elastic 
one.’11 In this respect, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the assertion that encroachments falling 
short of causing actual physical damage to neighbouring property should be automatically excluded 
from the ‘encroachment cases’ category.  
4.1 Pure economic loss and nuisance 
The second strand of the reasoning adopted by the Recorder in the County Court was that, 
notwithstanding the difficulties of categorising the claim as an encroachment case, damages were 
available in nuisance for purely financial loss stemming from the proximity of an undesirable 
                                                          
9 Williams (n 1) [38] (Etherton MR).  
10 ibid [41] (Etherton MR).  
11 ibid [42] (Etherton MR).  
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element. In this respect, the judge relied upon a number of cases where disgruntled local residents 
had sought to restrain the activities of ‘sex shops’, brothels and so forth on the grounds that they 
lowered the tone of the area (see Thompson-Schwab v Costaki12 and Laws v Florinplace Ltd).13 A 
similar conclusion was reached by the Truro County Court in Smith although different cases were 
relied on, including Bridlington Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity Board14 concerning interference with 
television reception.15  
In Williams, the Court of Appeal rejected the Recorder’s reasoning on the grounds that it was 
predicated on pure economic loss being recoverable in nuisance. The Court of Appeal considered the 
essential nature of the tort: 
The purpose of the tort of nuisance is not to protect the value of property as an investment 
or a financial asset. Its purpose is to protect the owner of land (or a person entitled to 
exclusive possession) in their use and enjoyment of the land as such as a facet of the right of 
ownership or right to exclusive possession.16  
Thus, undesirable activities may be actionable on the grounds that they constitute a material 
interference with a property right. Economic loss may be a symptom of such interferences, but it is 
not a cause of action in its own right. In any case, the Court of Appeal doubted whether the cases 
relied upon supported the argument made by the defendants in that the actions concerned 
applications for interlocutory relief; there was no mention of the impact of the sex establishments 
                                                          
12 [1956] 1 WLR 335 
13 [1981] 1 All ER 659 
14 [1965] Ch 436.  
15 Smith (n 7) [17].  
16 Williams (n 1) [48] (Etherton MR).  
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on property values.17  It appears safe to assume that the Court of Appeal would also have rejected 
the assertion accepted by Carr HHJ in Smith ‘that the diminution in value of the property amounts to 
an interference in their legitimate enjoyment of the land.’18 
In any event, the Court was strongly of the opinion that there was in fact a physical dimension to the 
harm in that ‘the mere presence of its rhizomes… imposes an immediate burden on the owner of the 
land.’19  The properties had been rendered more difficult and costly to develop in that any 
improvement or alteration work would require the removal of contaminated soil using specialist 
techniques. There was authority for the proposition that heavily soiled or contaminated property 
can be regarded as having been physically damaged notwithstanding the fact that it can be cleaned. 
Thus, in the Court of Appeal decision in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd Pill LJ gave the example of dust 
which has been trodden into a carpet requiring specialist cleaning.20 In Blue Circle Industries v 
Ministry of Defence,21 concerning liability under section 7(1)(a) of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, 
soil contaminated by low levels of radiation could be regarded as physically damaged in that costly 
specialist techniques were required to remove and dispose of the contaminated soil.   
As a result, the Court of Appeal found that an action in private nuisance could be maintained on the 
facts, upholding the decision of the Recorder below, albeit that his reasoning in establishing liability 
was flawed. 
                                                          
17 ibid [51] (Etherton MR).  
18 Smith (n 7) [17].  
19 Williams (n 1) [55] (Etherton MR).  
20 [1996] 2 WLR 348 (CA) 366F-H.  




The case is important in that it sits alongside the Supreme Court decision in Coventry v Lawrence22 as 
part of a concerted attempt by the senior courts to render private nuisance fit for purpose in the 
twenty-first century. One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the need to 
adopt a flexible approach towards the definition of actionable harm in nuisance. This has 
implications both for tort law doctrine and for how environmental harm is framed legally. In the 
attempt to use the different forms of action in private nuisance as justification for a narrow 
conception of physical damage, the Court of Appeal saw evidence of ‘medieval chain clanking’ which 
needed to be nipped in the bud. As Lord Atkin famously put it in United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank 
Ltd, ‘When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediæval chains the 
proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.’23   
For the purposes of tort law, another important aspect of the decision concerns the use of the term 
‘pure economic loss’ in nuisance. The concept of pure economic loss in nuisance is very different to 
the concept of pure economic loss in negligence. In negligence, pure economic loss is used to 
differentiate between physical harm and loss which is not anchored in physical harm. In Spartan 
Steel and Alloys v Martin,24 Lord Denning MR settled on policy reasons for excluding pure economic 
loss claims from negligence, including the classic floodgates argument.25 An arbitrary cut off point 
was selected beyond which financial losses were not regarded as sufficiently consequential upon the 
initial physical harm.  In private nuisance, losses may manifest themselves in financial form, such as 
the diminution in the market value of a property, but this is not to say that they constitute ‘pure 
                                                          
22 [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822. 
23 [1941] AC 1 (HL) 29.  
24 [1973] QB 27 (CA).  
25 ibid, 38G-39A. But note that Edmund-Davies LJ (dissenting) was regarded such arbitrary policy-based cut-off 
points as potentially unfair and preferred a more flexible approach based upon reasonable foreseeability. See 
45A (Edmund-Davies LJ).    
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economic loss’. The infringement of a property right which sounds in nuisance ‘is as concrete a form 
of loss as a broken arm or a smashed car’26 and, as it flows immediately and directly from the 
infringement of the right, it would be difficult to argue that it is in some sense removed from the 
harm. Moreover, the policy arguments at play in negligence do not come in to play in private 
nuisance as the floodgates are kept shut by the need to show a sufficient interest in the affected 
property. Thus, as the Court of Appeal pointed out in relation to the prior sex establishment cases, 
claims arose from the injurious affection of the use and enjoyment of property stemming from the 
knowledge that unsavoury activities were being conducted in the neighbourhood; not the 
diminution in the market value of properties per se. The Court of Appeal was clear that ‘the purpose 
of the tort of nuisance is not to protect the value of property as an investment or financial asset.’27  
This latter point raises an ambiguity since the Court of Appeal did not explain what is meant by 
simply using land as an investment or financial asset. Does this mean that no action would lie if the 
Japanese Knotweed encroached upon an area of waste ground acquired by a property speculator 
intent on holding onto it until the value increases – as part of a ‘land bank’ for example? A 
distinction between active use of a property and simply sitting on it in the hope that it may go up in 
value is not entirely unproblematic; however, there can be a fine line between simply relying on the 
intrinsic value of the land to generate a profit by operation of market forces and using the land for a 
specific business activity. The latter is clearly actionable in nuisance in that it is an aspect of the use 
and enjoyment of property. Suppose that the speculator in the aforementioned example decided 
that they wanted to develop the land but found that the Japanese Knotweed problem increased 
their costs; one could argue that a claim would lie in such circumstances.    
                                                          
 
26 Mark Wilde, ‘Magnohard Ltd v United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority: Claiming for the Economic and 
Psychological “Legacy” of Nuclear and Maritime Pollution’ (2004) 12Env Liability 243, 244.  
27 Williams (n 1) [48].  
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In thinking about how the reasoning in Williams conceptualises environmental harm in common law 
reasoning, the Court made the point that the harm in question could be construed as physical in any 
case. This was important for the doctrine of private nuisance to be applicable. In the past, a narrow 
conception of damage and a readiness to dismiss it as pure economic loss has served to restrict the 
use of tort in an environmental context. By using the language of ‘contamination’ to describe the 
presence of Japanese Knotweed, the Court was able to characterise the issue as one of 
environmental harm requiring specialist decontamination measures. This characterisation may have 
broader implications. 
A potential example of such implications is in relation to nuclear contamination. In Merlin v British 
Nuclear Fuels Ltd,28 the High Court had to determine whether radioactive dust constituted 
actionable harm within the meaning of section 7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. In the 
absence of any definitions of harm in the statute, Gatehouse J fell back upon the common law where 
he noted that pure economic loss was not generally recoverable. It is clear that he was primarily 
concerned with negligence and did not engage with the finer points about what constitutes pure 
economic loss in nuisance. This led him to the conclusion that the presence of contaminated dust 
could not be regarded as physical damage. Tromans noted that this approach was problematic: 
[T]he distinction seems to leave the law in a difficult state. How is removal of dust which is 
dissipated throughout a house substantially different to the removal of a layer of 
contaminated topsoil? If anything, it might be more difficult to remove dust which was in the 
interstices of roof spaces, floorboards, etc.29  
 
                                                          
28 [1990] 3 WLR 383.  
29 Stephen Tromans, ‘Nuclear Liabilities and Environmental Damage’ (1999) 1 Env Law Rev 59, 61.  
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Should the facts of Merlin be repeated, it seems that a different outcome may be reached. The 
Williams decision provides clear authority for the proposition that contaminated dust constitutes 
physical damage in that it is something which has to be cleaned up using specialist techniques. 
However, one could also argue that the mere presence of dust would give rise to a cause of action; 
not because it causes a financial detriment but because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of 
the property. The financial detriment should be regarded as inextricably intertwined with the 
violation of a property right and should not, therefore, be dismissed as pure economic loss and thus 
excluded from the scope of the statutory regime.  Clearly, such harms have an environmental 
dimension and the ability to frame them as concrete losses which cannot be dismissed as pure 
economic losses can only serve to extend the potential reach of tort in this context.        
6. Conclusion 
Overall the decision offers important clarifications of the nature of harm in nuisance which may 
widen the scope of the tort. For one thing, it seeks to undo much confusion caused by the 
importation of pure economic loss concepts from negligence into private nuisance. In nuisance, the 
loss is usually securely anchored in the infringement of the property right and cannot be regarded as 
‘pure’ economic loss.   Moreover, the decision pushes back against the forms of action trying to 
reassert themselves along the lines of physical and non-physical harm in the so-called encroachment 
cases. In this respect, the decision may serve to lessen the need to prove physical damage and 
strengthen the role of the amenity breed of nuisance.  In a secondary argument, the Court of Appeal 
considered that the harm could be regarded as physical in any event. This aspect of the judgment 
may have more far-reaching implications in terms of how environmental harm is conceptualized for 
the purposes of the common law.  
